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There are only a few conflict rules imbedded in treaty law concerning
property in general. One of them, the rule guaranteeing protection
20' of
property, is quite common; however, standards afforded in this respect
vary. One group of treaties states the rule in a general way, by providing
that "the most constant protection and security for property" will be
given (e.g., treaties with Argentina, 1853, Art. III; Uruguay, 1949, Art. VIII,
2; Ireland, 1950, Art. VIII, 2; Japan, 1953, Art. VI, 1). In other treaties
the standard of international law is adopted (e.g., with Poland, 1931, Art.
I, 4; Liberia, 1938, Art. I, 3; China, 1946, Art. VI, I; Italy, 1948,
Art. V, 1; Ireland, 1951, Art. VIII, 2). The extent and methods of
protection are determined by local substantive and procedural law, as
indicated expressly in the treaty with Colombia (1849, Art. 13) stating
that "both contracting parties promise and engage formally to give their
special protection to the . . . property of the citizens of each other . . .
leaving open and free to them the tribunals of justice for their judicial
recourse." In other treaties the protection is granted on the national
basis (e.g., with Liberia, 1938, Art. I, 4), or according to the most-favored-
nation clause (e.g., with Yugoslavia, 1881, Art. II, 1; Spain, 1902, Art. II;
Saudi Arabia, 1933, Art. II; Nepal, 1947, Art. 6), or by a combination of
both (Ireland, Art. VIII, 3).
This is the completion of an article, the first and second portions of which
appeared in 8 MIAMI L.Q. 501-529 and 9 MiAMI L.Q. 9-40.
201. Wilson, Property Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties,
45 Am. J. INT'L 83 (1951); WILSONTEu INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS IN TREATIES
OF THE UNITED STATES, 92 (1953); WILSON Natural Resources Provisions in United States
Commercial Treaties, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 355 (1954).
The treaties of peace (Paris, 1947) with Bulgaria (Art. 25,2), Hungary (Art. 29,2),
and Rumania (Art. 27,2) contain a uniform provision as to the law controlling liquidation
and disposition of property "within its territory and belonging" to nationals or corporations
of these enemy countries; it "shall be carried out in accordance with the law of the
Allied and Associated Powers concerned," i.e. lege loci. The same law shall determine
the extent to which such enemy aliens "shall have . . . rights with respect to such
property." Leiss and Dennett, European Peace Treaties after World War II, 140 (1954).
125
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In present times, property rights are frequently affected by one or another
type of expropriation.-02  The question as to what standard shall apply
in such situations was considered already in the treaty with Switzerland
(1850/55) where national treatment was promised "in cases of . .
expropriation for purposes of public utility" (Art. 11, 3). Recent treaties
center their attention to problems of nationalization. One type of rule
limits the possibility of such takings to specifically listed purposes (e.g., "for
public benefit," Art. VII, 3, with Greece, 1951; "for public purposes and
reasons of social utility as defined by law," Columbia, 1951, Art. VI,
3; "for public purpose," Japan, 1953, Art. VI, 3). In other type treaties
the standard of due process and payment of compensation is
set up 2 3 (e.g., treaty with China, 1946, Art. VI, 2; Italy, 1948, Art. V, 2;
Denmark, 1951, Art. VI, 3; Israel, 1951, Art. VI, 3). As to the law
applicable, only one treaty contains, at least, a hint. The treaty with
Uruguay (1949, Art. VIII, 2) prescribes that "any expropriation shall
be made in accordance with the applicable law" which may as well mean
a promise that expropriations will be, in regard to treaty aliens, executed
by constitutionally enacted measures. Moreover, a considerable number
of treaties contain the promise to apply to expropriations involving treaty
aliens (including corporations) one or another of the general standards,
e.g., national treatment (treaty with Uruguay, 1949, VIII, 2), in some
treaties combined with the most-favored-nation clause (e.g., with Italy,
1948, Art. V; Greece, 1951, Art. VII, 2; Japan, 1953, Art. VI, 2).
Interests in chattels.-In general, treaty aliens are entitled, according
to a rule restated in most of the treaties, to acquire, possess and dispose of
all kinds of personal property2 4 (e.g., treaties with Switzerland, 1850/55,
possess and dispose of every kind of movable property on the same terms as
the nationals"). There is, nevertheless, one treaty containing a complete
conflict rule. Art. XIV, 4, of the treaty with Sweden (1910) provides that
the "taking possession" of chattels disposed of "by sale, donation, testament,
or otherwise" shall be "in accordance with and acting under the provisions
202. Abel, Foreign Confiscatory Legislation and Private International Law, 6
Mon. L. REv. 166 (1943); Beitzke, Problerne der Enteignung in Internationalprivatrecht,
FESTSCHRIFT FUR RAAPE 109 (1948); FRILEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1953); RE, FOREcN CONFISICATION iN ANGLo-AMiERICAN LAw (1950); RE,
Nationalization and the Investment of Capital Abroad, 42 GEo. L.J. 44 (1953); Miller,
Expropriation and Foreign investment, 39 GEo. L.J. 1, 12 (1950); Savatier, Les
Nationalisations en Droit International Privd, 8/9 1RAVAUx DU CoMITE FRANcAIs DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL )RIVE 47 (1951); Wortley, Problemes sotdeves en Droit Inter-
national Privd par la Ldgislation sur I'Expropriation, 67 REcUEIL DES COURS (1lague), 345
(1939) and recently, De Nova Volkerrechtliche Betrachtungen iiber Konfiskation und
Enteignung, 52 FRIEDE1J.SWARTE 116 (1954).
Cf. Ozanic v. United States, 188 F,2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951).
203. Hyde, Compensation for Expropriation, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 108 (1939); Rubin,
Nationalization and Compensation, a Comparative Approach, 17 U. or Cal. L. Ri:v.
458 (1950).
204. GIBsoN, ALmENS AND THE LAW 45 (1941).
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of the laws of the jurisdiction in which the property is found," i.e., lege rei
sitae 20
5
Art. V; Bolivia, 1853, Art. XII, Guatemala, 1901, Art. II; Italy, 1948, Art.
VII, 3). In some treaties national treatment is set up as the controlling
standard, as in the treaty with Thailand (1937, Art. I, 6). In others, the
most-favored-nation standard is granted (e.g., with Great Britain, 1899, Art.
V; China, 1946, Art. VIII, 5; Uruguay, 1949, Art. VII, 4a). A few treaties
add a reference to the law locally applicable, (e.g., the treaty with Thailand,
upon compliance with the provisions of local law, the nationals
of each of the high contracting parties, shall . . . have the right to acquire;
Vessels.-According to the Convention establishing uniform rules
with respect to assistance and salvage at sea (Brussels, 1910, 37 STAT.
1658) the apportionment of remuneration in such cases is controlled by
the "law of the vessel's flag" (Art. 7). A different rule, however, is adopted
in the treaty providing for assistance to and salvage of vessels in danger
or shipwrecked on the coast or within the territorial waters of either
country, concluded with Mexico (1935, 49 STAT. 3359); as to assistance
and salvage "private vessels . . .shall be subject to the provisions of the
laws in force in the country in whose territorial waters such assistance is
rendered" (Art. 3) .200
Aircraft.-Important conflict rules regarding interests in aircraft are
contained in the Convention on the international recognition of rights in
aircraft (Geneva, 1948, TIAS 2847) .20  The nucleus of its legal structure
is the law of the country where the aircraft "was registered as to nationality,"
the quasi-national law of the aircraft.0 8 This law controls, according to
the Convention, the following matters:
205. In some of the recent treaties, restrictions established in municipal law are
upheld regarding, for example, shares in corporations "cairVing on particular types of
business" (e.g., with China, 1947, Art. VIII, 4; Ireland, 1951, Art. VII, 2; Colombia,
1951, Art. IX, 4), or matters "dangerous from the standpoint of public safety," like
fireams, explosives, poisons and habit.forming drugs" according to Art. VII, 2 of the
treaty with Ireland.
206. On the Convention for the unification of certain rules of law concerning
maritime liens and mortgages (Brussels, 1926), see Lord and Glenn, The Foreign
Ship Mortgage, 56 YALE LJ. 923 (1947).
207. The convention is now in force between the United States, Pakistan, Brazil
and Norvay. Ratifications by Mexico and Chile are not accepted by the United
States because of reservations they contain (text in 1951 U.S. Av. Rep. 130, 1952 U.S. &
Can. Av. Rep. 433).
Calkins, Creation and International Recognition of Title and Security Rights in
Aircraft, 15 f. AIR L. & COMM. 156 (1948); Wilberforce, The International Recognition
of Rights in Aircraft, 2 INT'L L.Q, 421 (1948); Moore, Some Principal Aspects of the
ICAO Mortgage Convention, 14 1. AIR L. & Cotm. 531' (1947); also Report and
Commentary of the Legal Committee of ICAO on the Draft (Brussels, 1947), 14 J.
AIx L. & CoMM. 505 (1947).
208. It is interesting to note that the Brussels draft (1947, 14 ). AIR L. & Com.,
501, 1947) used the expression "the law of the Contracting State whose nationality the
aircraft possesses." According to the Convention on international civil aviation (Chicago,
1944, TIAS 1591) aircraft have "the nationality of the State in which they are
registered" (Art. 17); as a consequence, an aircraft cannot "be validly registered in
more than one State, but its registration may be changed from one State to another"
(Art. 18).
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(i) rights in aircraft listed in Art. I, 1,20 which contracting countries
have undertaken to recognize, provided such interests "have been constituted
in accordance" with this law and are "regularly recorded in a public record
of such country" [Art. I, 1 (1) (ii) ]. The question arises, however, whether
or not the quasi-national law of the aircraft so referred to by the Convention
means only the substantive law of the country or its conflict rules as well.
The second interpretation seems to prevail. 10 It would follow, then, that
interests in aircraft will be internationally recognized (i.e., in the territories
of all contracting countries) whenever such interests have been created
validly according to conflict rules contained in the quasi-national law
of the aircraft, regardless of the fact that the law so applicable may not
be the law of the 'home country' of the aircraft, but the law of some
other country, perhaps even of a non-signatory to the Convention.2t' Conse-
quently, interests created outside of the country of national registration
(e.g., by transactions entered into abroad, or when the aircraft was, at
209. To facilitate the understanding of treaty law here involved, a list of rights
to be recognized under the Convention follows,
Rights to be recognized under the Convention are: (a) property, (b) "rights to
acquire aircraft by purcase coupled with possession of the aircraft," meaning the right
of a possessor to have the title transferred to him upon performance, on his part, of
deferred obligations, e.g., payment of the purchase price (conditional sale). (c) right
to possession under leases of six months or more (especially designed to cover situations
involving equipment trusts and trust receipts); (d) "mortgages, hypotheques and similar
rights" of a contractual origin (therefore not liens or interests created by law, by
attachment, etc.) for payment of "an indebtedness," not necessarily connected with
the security involved.
As to recordation of ownership, lease, mortgage, etc., see 19 U.S.C. § 523 (1948);
as to Florida, FiA. STAT. § 329.01 (1953).
Claims rank as follows: I. priority claims according to the Convention (a) costs
(Art. VII, h), (b) compensation for salvage and preservation (Art. IV, 1) since these
claims are given, according to the Convention, "priority over all other rights in the
aircraft," (c) claims for injuries and damages in the sense of Art. VI1 (5); Il. claims
to be recognized under the Convention after privileged claims: claims as recorded and
ranking under the law of the county of "registration as to nationality"; 111. claims
recorded and enforceable under the law of other countries (Art. I, 2, Art. 11, 2) which
claims will be treated according to the conflict law of the forum.
210. Calkins (supra note 207, at 164) states that "the discussion of Brussels makes it
amply clear that what is intended is the entire law of a Contracting State, including its law
on conflict of laws." Wilberforce (supra note 207 at 434), on the other hand, appears more
cautious when he states that "specific proposals to add the words 'including the rules
of conflict of laws' were rejected. On the final reading the Chairman . . . said
'The consequence was that the Brussels text remained as it stood and this was
satisfactory .... ' The result seems to be that States may apply their rules on conflict
of laws if they think fit," This would mean countries are to be free to interpret treaty
law as to whether it includes only the substantive law or conflict law as well, according
to their own rules of interpretation.
An additional conflict rule in the nature of inter-provincial conflict law is contained
in Art. XVII, that "If a separate register of aircraft for purposes of nationality is
maintained in any territory for whose foreign relations a Contracting State is responsible.
reference in this Convention to the law of the Contracting Country shall be construed
as reference to the law of that territory.'"
211, The question what law controls the relation between primary parties to the
creation of interests in aircraft is not decided in the Convention. Nevertheless, taking
into consideration Art. 1 (2), one may conclude that the law applicable according
to the conflict law of the home country will control the international recognition of
such interests.
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the time of creation of the interest involved, in a foreign country), will
be tested, as to their international recognition, according to the law
declared applicable by the conflict law of the 'home country.' This law
may apply, with regard to aircraft and interests in them, a principle
similar to the lex nationalis which will follow, so to speak, the aircraft
wherever it may fly. In this case, the lex nationalis of the aircraft will
control all interests in aircraft "registered as to nationality" within such
country, including transactions abroad or transactions entered into at a
time when the aircraft was located abroad. On the contrary, if the conflict
rule of the 'home country' follows the territorial contact in the sense of
the lex situs of the aircraft at the time of the transaction involved, then
foreign law so identified will control the creation of interests in the
aircraft. In both cases such interests may be said to have been "constituted
in accordance with the law of the Contracting State" involved.212  This
alone will not, however, suffice to secure international recognition of
interests so created since, according to the Convention, such interests
must also be "regularly recorded" in the 'home country' of the aircraft.
The compliance with this additional requirement may run into difficulties
in countries where, under their municipal recording statutes, only interests
permissible under their substantive municipal law are recordable (Art. II, 3).
(ii) The same law, i.e., the law of quasi-nationality of the aircraft
will control also the "regularity of successive recordings in different
Contracting States" (Art. II, 1) as well as
(iii) the method of public notice required in case of forced sale of
an aircraft (as prescribed by Art. VII, 2, b);
(iv) this law will determine the extent to which recorded interests
will affect spare parts (Art. X, 1).
Around the nucleus of the quasi-national law of the aircraft other legal
systems are arranged; these laws control, according to the convention,
certain specific aspects. The applicable law of any other contracting
country will govern:
212. Calkins (aupra note 207, at 167) suggests that it is possible "to have a transfer
of an aircraft, made when the aircraft is outside the jurisdiction of the state of its registry,
effected in accordance with the law of the foreign state"; this will be correct only
where, under the law of the country of registry, the law of the situs of the aircraft
controls, and, in addition, such transaction is recordable under the law of the country
of registry. The statement that "if the State in which the aircraft is located at the
time of the attempted creation of the interest, does not recognize such interests. then
apparently no valid right will have been created under the Convention, even though
the home state does recognize such rights in its own municipal law" is consistent
with the position taken by the author only where, according to the conflict law of the
country of registry, the creation of such interests is governed by the lex situs. However,
in a case where, according to the conflict law of the country of registry, its substantive
law applies regardless of the situs of the aircraft, foreign law (the law of the situs)
will be disregarded. In these situations the lex situs cannot prevent the creation of
interests in an aircraft in spite of the fact that such aircraft is located, at the critical
time, within its territory, if, according to the law of the country of registration, the
latter country's law applies as a quasi-national law.
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(i) the recognition of any right in aircraft except where international
recognition is imposed by the convention (Art. I, 2);
(ii) rights of third parties (i.e., not participant in the establishment
of interests listed in Art. I, 1), except where the convention contains
express provisions superseding the municipal law otherwise applicable, e.g.,
Art. I (2), IV, VI, VII (5);
(iii) municipal law also controls the right to prohibit "the recording
of any right which cannot validly be constituted according to its national
law" (Art. II, 3), which rule will be applied, for example, by countries
where the only security interest in chattels is pledge. It is to be noted,
however, that interests once validly created in compliance with the
convention (Art. I, 1) cannot be defeated by the transfer of registration
of an aircraft (Art. XI);
(iv) the same law will decide the question whether the filing for
recording alone will have the effect of recording (Art. III, 3), provided,
of course, such recording was subsequently executed. 13
In some instances the convention refers to the lex fori as controlling.
As already indicated above, the law of the forum where the claim involving
salvage or preservation of an aircraft is being litigated will "determine
the contingencies upon which the three months period may be interrupted
or suspended" (Art. IV, 4, b).
Another lex fori appears in the convention, the forum where the
forced sale of the aircraft takes place. As already indicated above,
(i) the procedure of such sale is governed by the lex fori executionis
(Art. VII, 1);
(ii) the same law will determine consequences of failure to comply
with requirements of notice of such sale (Art. VII, 3); and
(iii) the question of what costs are chargeable as a preferred claim, to
the proceeds (Art. VII, b).
Another special forum executionis is the one in whose jurisdiction,
in addition to the fact that the "execution sale takes place" there, an
injury to person or damage to property on surface was inflicted by an
aircraft subject to any rights recognized acocrding to the convention
(lex fori et loci delicti). The domestic law in force in such jurisdiction
granting such claims priority, will prevail, with certain limitations, over
priorities established according to the conventiori (Art. I, 1), provided
municipal law stays within standards established by the convention (Art.
VII, 5, a and b). In case there is no such municipal law in force, the
Convention supplies its own rle (Art. VII, 5).
213. See 62 STAT. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 523 (d), with limitations in § 523
(a) (3).
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There is, lastly, the law of the place where the "operations of salvage
or preservation were terminated" (Art. IV, 1). A claim based upon such
operations will be granted priority as against interests to be recognized
under the convention, provided such claim is recognized according to
the municipal law of the lex loci actus, and, in addition, there is "a charge
against the aircraft," in the nature of a lien.214
Real property.-The well established rule that interests in land are
governed by the law of the situs became a treaty problem where local
law prevented treaty aliens from holding land in general215 or from taking
it upon death (escheat, droit d'aubaine).216 This type of discrimination
blossomed under feudal law and continued in force in many countries
changing its motivation from the interests of the feudal lord to reasons
of national policy.217
214. Till now this country did not adhere to any of the international agreements
concerning negotiable instruments, particularly not to the Convention for settlement of
certain conflict of laws in connection with bills of exchange and promisory notes (Geneva,
1930), nor to the parallel convention concerning check (Geneva, 1931); Hudson andTeller, International Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange, 44 HARV. L. REv.
333 (1931); Gutteridge, Unification of the Law of Bills of Exchange, 12 BAIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 13, 21 (1931); Guerrico, Unification and Present Statul of Negotiability Legis-
lation in America, 29 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1944). Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked
that there is a scintilla of treaty conflict law. The now superseded Agreement concern-
ing money orders (Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, Panama, 1936, 50 STAT.
1708) contained two significant conflict rules: one, that the law of the place of indorse-
ment controls the question of permissibility of such indorsement (Art. VI), and the
other, that the law applicable to tho issuance and payment of money orders is the law
"in force within the country of origin or the country of destination as the case may be"
(Art. 13). Later agreements (Rio de Janeiro, 1946, 61 STAT. 3540, and the recent
agreement of 1950, 2 UST 1449) formulates the first provision to read that the con-
tracting countries "are authorized to permit in their territory and in accordance with
their domestic legislation, the endorsement of money orders originating in any country"
(Art. VII), while the second runs that "money orders exchanged between two countries
are subject, insofar as their issue and payment are concerned, to the provisions in force in
the countries of origin and destination, as the case may be, applicable to domestic money
orders" (Art. 14).
215. DAvIEs, THE LAW OF ALIENS (1931); GIBSON, ALIENS AND THE LAW (1940);
I POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 369 (1949); Wilson, Natural-Resources
Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 355, 365 (1954).
Comment, Conflict Between Local and National Interest in Alien Land Holding Restric-
tions, 16 U. or CHI. L. REV. 315! (1948); KoNviTZ, ThE ALIEN AND TiE ASIATIC
IN AMERICAN LAW (1946).
216. For a discussion, see Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); CAILLEMER,
CONFISCATION ET ADMINISTRATION DES SUCCESSIONS PAR LES POUVOIRS PUBLICS DU
MOVEN ACE. . . 147, 171 (1901).
217. For federal law, see 48 U.S.C. 0t 1501-1508 (1952). MacClintock, Aliens
under the Federal Laws of the United States, 4 ILL. L. REV. 95 (1909).
On state law, I. POWELL, op. cit supra note 215 at 372 (1949); Orfield, Alien Rights
in Nebraska, 17 Neb. L. BULL. 3 (1938); Pratt, Present Alienage Disabilities under New
York State Law in Real Property, 12 BROOKLYN L. Rr:v. 1 (1942); Ward, The Missis-
sippi Alien Statute, 11 Miss. L.J. 313 (1939). Comment, Right of an Alien to Own
Land in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 607 (1929); Validity of State Restraints on Alien Owner-
ship of Land, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1053 (1953); The Alien Land Laws, a Reappraisal, 56
YALE L.J. 1017 (1947). For a recent case, see Pavlick v. Meridan Trust and Safe
Deposit Co., 107 A.2d 262 (Conn. 1954). See also Florida's DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
I 18 (1926).
Impact of treaties, I POWELL, op. cit. supra note 215, at 399; Cowles, International
Law in Inland States, a Case Study, 28 NEB. L. REv. 387, 393 (1949); Duwalt, The
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These developments make it understandable why this particular facet
of the rule of the situs prevails in treaty law, reinforced, in many instances,
by an express reservation in favor of local law."" "All that relates to the
acquisition, possession and disposition of immovable property . . . shall ...
be subject exclusively to the applicable law of the situs of such immovable
property," declares the treaty with Thailand (1937, Art. I, 7), adding,
in regard to this country, that "The applicable laws of the situs of immovable
property... shall be understood and construed to mean the laws applicable
to immovable property of the state, territory or possession of the United
States of America in which such immovable property is situated; and
nothing therein shall be construed to change, affect or abrogate the laws
applicable to immovable property of any state, territory or possession . . .
The straight rule of the situs is repeated in recent treaties, e.g., with Ireland
(1951, Art. VII, 3) stating that the ownership of real property "shall be
subject to the applicable laws therein," a formula used also in the treaties
with Ethiopia (1951, Art. XI) and Germany (1954, Art. IX, 1). The same
rule is adopted, in regard to land in this country, in a line of treaties (with
China, 1946, Art. VIII, 1; Italy, 1948, Art. VII, 1, a; Uruguay, 1949, Art.
VII, b; Israel, 1951, Art. IX, 1, b; Japan, 1954, Art. 15, 2)210 while American
Treaties of the United States and Alien Land Laws of Illinois, 43 CENT. L.J. 211 (1896).
The effect of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights is discussed in Fuji
v. State of California, 242 P. 2d 617 (Cal. 1952) followed in Harruye Masaoka v. People,
245 P.2d 1062 (Cal. 1952). Wright, National Constitution and Human Rights - the
Fuji Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1951); Preuss, Some Aspects of the Human Rights
Provisions of the Charter and Their Execution in the United States, 46 Am. J. INT'L L.289 (1952).
218. A mutual reservation of this kind is adopted, for example, in the treaty with
Switzerland (1850/5, Art. V, 2) according the right to dispose of and acquire "real estate
situated in the States of the American Union, or within the Cantons of the Swiss Con-
federation, in which foreigners shall be entitled to hold or inherit real estate."
The treaty with' France (1853) contains an identical provision that "In all States
of the Union, whose existing laws permit it so long and to the same extent as the said
laws shall remain in force (this last phrase added as an amendment by the Senate and
accepted by Switzerland, 6 MILLER, op. cit. supra note 50, at 181 ) Frenchmen shall enjoy
the right of possession . . . real property . . . as citizens of the United States" (Art. VII).
It is important to notice that France proposed (note of September 30, 1852, 6 MILLER,
op. cit. supra note 50 at 188) national treatment for Frenchmen in this country pointing
out that under French law (statute of July 14, 1819, repealing Art. 726 and 912 of
the Civil Code) there is no discrimination against aliens. After prolonged negotiations
the French proposal was rejected (6 MILLER op. cit. supra note 50 at 190). Instead,
the next paragraph, reaffirming the reservation already contained in the beginning of
the article, stated that "As to the States of the Union, by whose existing laws (which
seems not to cover completely the above mentioned addition to paragraph one) aliens
are not permitted to hold real estate" the President promised to recommend the passage
of necessary laws which promise was promptly performed (6 MILLER, Op. cit. supra
note 50 at 193). In view of this background the interpretation in Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258 (1890) appears questionable (see notes 43 and 50 supra) taking
also into account that a reservation in favor of the law of the situs in regard
of this country was a constant feature in all previous treaties with France, (1778,
Art. IX, and 1800, Art. VII). CASCJION, CODE DIPLOMATIQUE DES AUBAINS, OU LE
DROIT CONVENTIONEL ENTRE LA FRANcE ET LES AUTRES PUISSANCES RELATIVE-
MENT A LA CAPACITE RECIPROQUE D'A2UERIR OU TRANSMETTRE DES BIENS M aILES OR
IMMEUBLES . . , (1818); DELAUME, LES CONFLITS DR LoIs A LA VEILLE DU CODE
CIVIL 161, 314 (1947).
219. An interesting situation could arise in a state granting aliens national treat-
ment (without requiring reciprocity) if the alien's country denies such treatment to our
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nationals are accorded in the respective foreign countries national treatment
conditioned upon reciprocity. However, national treatment regarding aliens'
interests in land in this country is granted only exceptionally, for example,
in the treaty with Argentina (1853), Art. IX providing that "In whatever
relates to . . . acquiring and disposing of property of every sort and
denomination, either by sale, donation, exchange, testament or any other
manner whatsoever . . . the citizens shall reciprocally enjoy the same
privileges, liberties and rights, as native citizens." 220  Other treaties grant
the most-favored-nation treatment (e.g., with Yugoslavia, 1881, Art. II;
Spain, 1902, Art. III, 3; Sweden, 1910, Art. 14, 5). Some treaties are
restrictive and guarantee a mere non-discriminatory alien treatment, as the
treaty with Austria (1928, Art. 1, 3) granting treaty aliens ". . . subject
to reciprocity, the treatment generally accorded to foreigners by the law of
the place where the property is situated" 22' (same in Art. IX, 3 of the
treaty with Denmark, 1951).
However, the strict rule upholding the law of the situs discriminating
against holding of land by treaty aliens proved to be harmful to favorable
international relations. A trend toward relaxing such discrimination grew
stronger during the first half of our century when aliens were permitted
to hold land for specific purposes connected with the enjoyment of
privileges granted them under the treaties, e.g., for "residential, scientific,
religious, philanthropic, manufacturing, commercial and mortuary
purposes upon the same terms as nationals" (e.g., treaties with
El Salvador, 1926, Art. I; Finland, 1934, Art. I, 2; Greece, 1951, Art.
IX, 1) all this irrespective of local law. Some of the recent treaties even
dispense with enumerating these purposes and substitute instead a general
clause granting treaty aliens the right to hold land where such holding is
"incidental to or necessary for the enjoyment of rights secured by the
provisions of the present treaty" (e.g., with Ireland, 1950, Art. VII, 3;
Denmark, 1951, Art. IX, 3). Similar functional privileges are extended for
consular premises (convention with Liberia, 1928, Art. II, 3). Article 7
of the consular convention with Great Britain (1951) grants the right to
acquire land for consular premises "under such form of tenure as may exist
nationals. According to the language of this type of treaty, the applicability of the lax
situs in this country seems unconditional, and, consequently, the advantage of the
lex situs cannot be withheld from treaty aliens. Apparently, this treaty provision was
drafted under the assumption that the only restrictions to consider are those in force in
this country while it was assumed that foreign countries have no parallel restrictions.
However, recent developments indicate that the liberalizing trend is gaining momentum
in this country while abroad, under the impact of nationalistic and collectivistic ideas,
the opposite appears to be true.
220. This provision was successfully invoked by a British subject residing in Canada,
under the most-favored-nation clause (1899) in the unreported case Texas v. Fasken
(app. dism. 274 U.S. 724, 1926), 1 POWELL, O0. cit. supra note 215 at 402, note 22.
221. This version was taken from the not ratified treaty of Lausanne (1927) as
against the Austrian proposal to adopt the most-favored-nation treatment which appeared
undesirable in view of Art. IX of the treaty with Argentina, 1853; 1 U.S. FORErGN REL.:
1928 at 926.
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under the laws of the territory" (also Ireland, 1951, Art. VII)2 2 2  In some
treaties specific reservations in favor of local building and zoning laws
are added (e.g., treaties with the Philippines, 1947, Art. III; Costa Rica, 1948,
Art. V; Great Britain, 1951, Art. VII, 2).
Similarly, there are treaties relaxing the strict law of the situs rule
in regard of other types of interest in land as, for example, leases.223
Pursuant to these treaties (e.g., with Italy, 1948, Art. 1, 2, b; Uruguay, 1949,
Art. VII, 1, a; Colombia, 1950, Art. IX, 1, a; Israel, 1951, Art. IX, 1, a;
Japan, 1953, Art. IX, 1)224 leases may be acquired by treaty aliens for
specific purposes enumerated in the treaty under the national treatment.
A general clause referring to the "conduct of activities pursuant to the
present treaty" is used in the treaty with Ethiopia (1951, Art. IX, 1, a).
On the contrary, disposition of land held by treaty aliens is generally
favored 225 and national treatment (e.g., Uruguay, 1949, Art. Vii, 4, b;
Colombia, 1951, Art. IX, 5; Israel, 1951, Art. IX, 1; Greece, 1951, Art.
IX, 3), or most-favored-nation treatment (Great Britain, 1899, Art. V) or
both combined (Japan, 1953, Art. IX, 4) are granted. 226
Copyright.-It may well be put forward that under the Copyright
Law22 7 aliens are accorded national treatment, provided such author is
domiciled in this country at the time of the first publication, or, his
country "grants either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law" American
nationals substantially the same protection which requirement must be
established by Presidential Proclamation, or, finally, according to the
Universal Copyright Convention (1952) in regard to nationals of signatory
222. Special privileges are secured in relation to Germany that both governments
may "acquire, own, lease for any period of time or otherwise hold and occupy, such
lands, buildings, and appurtenances as may be necessary for governmental, other than
military, purposes"; in case local permission is required it "shall be given on request"
(Art. 19 of the 1923 treaty with Germany as amended in 1953, 28 DEP'T STATE BULL,
877, 1953, remaining in force according Art. 28 of the 1954 treaty).
223. By an exchange of notes (1933, 48 STAT. 1769) Art. \111 of the 1853 con-
sular convention with France was clarified with regard to leases of American nationals
in France reaffirming national treatment; l)rALXUrE op. cit. supra note 43 at 30, citing
cases. Note also Lambert v. Jourdan (1948), Am. J. INT'L L. 206 (1950) discussing Art.
I1 of the law of May 28, 1943; NIBOYET, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVF
FRANcAIs 311 (1949).
Note Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 195 P.2d I (Cal. 1948) where expired treaty
provisions on leases survived in consequence of its incorporation into local law.
224. Nebraska law establishing restrictions upon disposition over homestead land
was held consistent with Art. VI of the treaty with Sweden (1827) in Todok v. Union
State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930).
225. Wilson, Natural-Resources Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties,
48 Am. J. INT'L L. 355, 367 (1954).
226. For treaty law governing vested interests in land, see Art. VIII of the Guadelupe-
Hidalgo treaty with Mexico (1848), Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554
(1947); also Art. 1V of the treaty with China regarding the relinquishment of extraterri-
torial rights in China, 57 STAT. 767 (1943).
227. As reenacted in 1947, 61 STAT. 652 and amended in 1954, Ch. 1161, Pub].
Law 743.
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countries or of countries where the work was first published.2 With this
understood by way of preface, numerous bilateral agreements may be noticed
according national treatment under conditions as "prescribed by the laws
of the country where the protection is claimed," i.e., lege fori (Art. 2
of the treaty with Hungary, 1912); the same law controls the "term of
copyright protection" (Art. 3). According to the treaty with China (1946,
Art. IX), registration and other formalities are controlled by the "applicable
law and regulations," i.e., by the law applicable according to the local
conflict law; in addition, the treaty guarantees "effective protection
by civil action" (Protocol 5, b).
Brief mention should be made of collective international agreements
in matters of copyright. The interamerican convention on literary and
artistic copyrights (Mexico, 1902, 35 STAT. 1934) contains a reservation
in favor of the lex loci delicti by providing that publications infringing
copyright may be confiscated "but without prejudice to the indemnities
or punishments to which the falsifiers may be liable according to the
laws of the country in which the fraud has been committed" (Art. 13).
A substantially identical provision was repeated in Art. 14 of the 1910
convention (Buenos Aires, 38 STAT. 1785). 229
The recently ratified Universal Copyright Convention (Geneva,
1952)230 grants, in principle, national treatment to nationals of all con-
tracting countries as well as in regard of works first published in the same
country, with a possibility to assimilate, by domestic legislation, "to its
own nationals any person domiciled in that State" (Art. II). The duration
of the copyright protection is governed by the lex fori ("by the law of the
Contracting State in which protection is claimed") with a uniform minimum
period added by the convention (Art. IV, 2). The period, however, may
228. TREATIES IN FORCE, A LIST OF TREATIES . . . 167, 170 (1944); Peterson,
Protection Afforded Alien Authors by American Copyright Law, 18 Nia. L. BULL. 257
(1930).
229. Ladas, Interamerican Copyrights, 7 U1 OF PITT. L. Rev. 283 (1941); UNION
PANAMERICANA, PROTECCION DEL DERECHO D AUTOR EN AMERICA DE ACCUERDO
coN LAS LEGISLACIONES NACIONALES Y TRATADOS INTERAMERICANOS (1950).
The Washington convention, 1946, is not yet in force. Comment, The Inter-
american Copyright Convention, Its Place in United States Copyright Law, 60 HARV.
L. REv. 1329 (1947). Cf. Hoffman, The Position of the United States in Relation to
International Copyright Protection of Literary Works, 22 U.OF CiN. L. REV. 415 (1953);
Schulman, International Copyright in thd United States, a Critical Analysis, 19 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1954).
230. Ratified, but not yet in force (31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 970, 1954); 83d Congr.,
1st Sess., Senate, Exec. M; 83d Congr. 2d Sess., Senate, Exec. Rep. No. 5; Universal
Copyright Convention and Implementing Legislation (Hearings before . . . Committee
on Foreign Relations . . . , April 7 and 8, 1954).
Dubin, The International Copyright Convention, 42 CAL. L. REv. 89 (1954); Honig,
International Copyright Protection and the Draft International Copyright Convention of
the UNESCO, 2 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 88 (1953); Schulman, Another View of Article
IllI of the Universal Copyright Convention, 1953 Wis L. REV. 297 Warner, The
UNESCO Universal Copyright Convention, 1952 Wise. LAW REV.. 493. Comment,
International Copyright Convention and the United States: the Impact of the UNESCO
Universal Copyright Convention on Existing Law, 62 YALE L.J. 1065 (1953).
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be shorter in cases of published works if the duration is, according to the
law of the country where the work was first published, shorter than the
applicable lex fori, or, in cases of unpublished works, the period may be
shortened by the law of the country of which the author is a national
(Art. IV, 4); and, it may be added, the law of the country of publication
or of nationality apply according to the same lex for-all rules reminiscent
of our borrowing statutes. Another provision of the convention presents
the application of the lex for rule to judicial proceedings in copyright
matters. According to the convention (Art. III, 3), plaintiff must, "in
bringing the action, comply with procedural requirements, such as that
the complainant must appear through domestic counsel or that the
complainant must deposit with the court or administrative officer, or both,
a copy of the work involved in the litigation." This requirement, however,
does not affect the valdity of the copyright nor can it be imposed only
against treaty aliens.
Patents.-Bilateral treaties stipulate, as a rule, national treatment2
31
(e.g., Uruguay, 1949, Art. V, 1, b; Ireland, 1951, Art. VI, 1, b); other
treaties prefer a combination of the national with the most-favored-nation
treatment (Colombia, 1951, Art. X; Israel, 1951, Art. X; Denmark, 1951,
Art. X; Japan, 1953, Art. X; Germany, 1954, Art. X). Among the collective
treaties, the interamerican convention for the protection of patents,
inventions, designs and industrial models (Buenos Aires, 1910, 38 STAT.
1811) deserves brief mention. It provides that the transfer of a patent
shall be controlled by the "law of the country" (Art. VIII), apparently
meaning the lox loci actus.
Trade-marks.-Bilateral treaties grant national treatment upon comply-
ing with the applicable local law (e.g., treaties with France, 1869, Art. I;
Uruguay, 1949, Art. V, 1, b; Ireland, 1951, Art. VI, 1, b) while others
assure national combined with the most-favored-nation treatment (e.g.,
Italy, 1948, Art. VIII; Colombia, 1951, Art. X; Greece, 1951, Art. X; Japan,
1953, Art. X; Germany, 1954, Art. X).232 Among collective treaties, some
conflict rules contained in the interamerican convention (Buenos Aires,
1910) have already been discussed. Here, it may be added that according
to Art. II of the 1929 convention (Washington, 46 STAT. 2907) the transfer
of a trade-mark is governed by the "internal law of the state in which
such transfer took place." 233
231. TREATIES IN FORCE, A LIST OF TREATIES . . . 190 (1944). LAPAs, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (1930); LADAS, The Self-Executing
Character of International Conventions on Industrial Property; 31 TRADE-MARK REP.
5 (1941).
232. Federico, Treaties Between the United States and Other Countries Relating to
Trade-Marks, 39 TRADE-MARK REP. Supp. (1949).
233. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TIRADE-MARICS BY THE AMERICAN
REPUBLICS (1932); Holliday, Interamerican Conventions for the Protection of Trade-
Marks, 28 CAN. B. REV. 609 (1950).
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XIV
FAMILY LAW
Questions of family law are considered mainly in treaties with countries
where such questions are classified as constituting the personal status of treaty
aliens. Illustrative of such remnants of Capitulations are a few treaties
with Middle East countries, for example, the agreement between Great
Britain and Iraq (1922) applicable also to American nationals; they read
that "In matters relating to the personal status of foreigners . . . in
which it is customary by international usage to apply the law of another
counry, such law shall be applied in a manner prescribed by law" (Art. 4).
The respective national law will, consequently, control questions of "mar-
riage, divorce, maintenance, dowry, guardianship of infants" with the
proviso that this must be "without prejudice to the provisions of any
law relating to the jurisdiction of religious courts." Substantially similar
though more elaborate provisions are included in the agreement with
Iran (1928) where questions of personal status are enumerated as relating
to "marriage and conjugal rights, divorce, judicial separation, dowry, pater-
nity, affiliation, adoption, capacity of persons, majority, guardianship,
trusteeship, and interdiction . .." These matters "and in general, family
law of non-Moslem nationals of the United States of America in Persia
shall be subject to their national law" while Iranian nationals in this
country shall "enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the matter of per-
sonal status."234  The notion of personal status was also used in the
Montreux convention (1937) to limit consular jurisdiction to "matters
of personal status in all cases in which the law applicable is the national
law" of the country exercising consular jurisdiction in Egypt (Art. 10);
personal status comprising "the status and capacity of persons, legal
relations between members of a family, or more particularly, betrothal,
marriage, the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife, dowry,
and their rights of property during marriage, divorce, repudiation, separation,
legitimacy, recognition and repudiation of paternity, the relation between
ascendants and descendants, the duty of support as between relatives by
blood or marriage, legitimation, adoption, guardianship, curatorship,
emancipation . . . ." Corresponding conflict rules are set out in full (Art.
X, 3) in Art. 20 of the R glement annexed to the convention.
While the time-honored 'commercium' still remains one of the main
features of treaty law, the twin privilege of 'connubium' has disappeared.
It is therefore interesting to find that such a provision was inserted in the
treaty with Nicaragua (1867, 15 STAT. 554, terminated in 1902); Art. IX
of this treaty provided that "the citizens of the United States residing in
Nicaragua, or the citizens of Nicaragua residing in the United States, may
234. Greenfield and Aghakoff, Droits des Personnes, de Famille, des Successions et
Donations des Etranzgers dans la Lgislation Iranienne, 15 ANNuARIO ni IRITTO Co01x-
PARATO . . . 243 (1941).
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intermarry with the natives of the country; hold and possess . . . by
marriage . . any estate, real or personal .... ,,235 The conflict rule of lex loci
celebrationis was included in the treaty with El Salvador (1870, 18 STAT.
725, terminated in 1893) providing that in case nationals of one country
marry in the other "according to the laws, such marriage shall be considered
legal in the other country" (Art. 29, 2) .230
xv
DEcmrwrF s' Es'rATmS
Generally, treaties guarantee the right to dispose by will of real as
well as personal property. 23T  Such freedom of testamentary disposition,
a corollary to the general guarantee of disposition of property, may be
granted outright (e.g., Art. 12 of the treaty with Colombia, 1S46),238 or
under any of the international standards of treatment, i.e., under the
national treatment (Argentina, 1853, Art. IX, qualified with reciprocity), 230
under the most-favored-nation clause (Yugoslavia, 1881, Art. 11,240 Great
235. According to news dispatches, a reappearance of the problem is imminent in
Spain'
236. Some of the recent treaties (with Great Britain, 1951, Art. 17, 2; Ireland,
1951, Art. 17, 2) provide that the fact a marriage "celebrated under the law of the
territory" was registered by the consul, in no way dispenses from the duty of registration
as imposed "by the law of the territory." The same applies with regard to births and
deaths.
237. For an exhaustive list of treaties, see UNITED STATES TREATY DEVELOPMENTS,
App. III, C.
GIBSON, ALIENS AND TIlE LAw (1940); Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to
Real Property by Aliens, 51 MICn. L. REV. 1001 (1953); LAWRENCE, CONFLICT OF FOR-
EIGN TREATIES WITH STATE LAWS RELATIVE TO THE TRANSMISSION OF REAL EsTATE
TO ALIENS (1871); Lenoir, The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties with Special Refer-
ence to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34 CEO. LJ. 129 (1946). Comment,
Right of Nonresident Aliens to Take Real and Personal PropertyJ . . . , 25 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 329 (1952). Note, Right of an Alien to Take Land by Descent, 5 MINN. L. REv.
373 (1921). Cf. Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Sateliieat to Share
in Estates of American Descendents 25 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1952) and EmMEmucl,
ESTATE PRACTICE IN THlE UNITED TATES AND IN EUROPE (1950).
238. "The citizens of each of the Contracting Parties shall have the power to dis.
pose of their personal goods or real estate within the jurisdiction of the other, by .. .
testament or otherwise, and their representatives being citizens of the other party, shall
succeed to their said personal goods or real estate, whether by testament or ad
intestato . .. ."
The term "goods and effects" used in other treaties includes real property as well;
Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U. S. 449 (1930).
239. See note 220 sura.
240. In re Arbulich's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P. 2d 433 (1953); cert. denied, 346
U-S. 897 (1953); rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 908 (1953); the question of reciprocity
imposed under state law was discussed while the most-favored-nation clause went almost
unnoticed, except that the appellate court [In re Arbulich's Estate, 248 P.2d 179, 437
(1952)] wrote: "Even if we assume its applicability in that respect, however, the
rights granted are only those given by each of the contracting nations 'to the subiects of the
most-favored-nations' and do not purport to equal the rights given or guaranteed by each
of the contracting nations to its own citizens. Consequently, the treaty provisions do
not establish the reciprocal rights required by the Probate Code." It may be added that
according to BARTos-NIKoLAjEvic, PRAVNI PoLozAJ STRANACA 191 (1951) the "Yugoslav
system is based upon protective provisions limiting foreign owned property" which sys-
tem proved to be, in its international repercussions, "more damaging than useful"; accord-
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Britain, 1899, Art. V; Sweden, 1910, Art. XIV, 5; Ethiopia, Art. IX) or by
a combination of both (Germany, 1954, Art. IX, 4). Howevcr, conflict
rules as such are few. A rule governing the form of wilts appears in the
Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war (Geneva, 1929,
47 STAT. 2021). According to Art. 76 (1) of the convention, wills "shall
be received and drawn up in the same way as for the soldiers of the national
army," meaning that the prisoners' national law, 241 i.e., the law of the army
to which they belong, and not the lex loci actus, normally the national law
of the detaining power, will control. The provision was redrafted in the
recent convention (Geneva, 1949)242 to read that such wills shall be drafted
as to "satisfy the conditions of validity required by the legislation of their
country of origin" (Art. 120); 'origin' apparently meaning not their national
origin or their domicile, but the law of their military 'origin,' i.e., the law
of the country of which they are soldiers.
Regarding the taking of realty, the common law rule is to be born
in mind that aliens have no "inheritable blood" and may take only under
statute or by purchase (including devise), or in pursuance of a treat. 243
So it is not surprising to find that this principle was adopted in the treaty
with another common law country, Great Britain (1899, Art. I, in force
also regarding other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations,
e.g., Canada, Australia;2 44 an identical provision is inserted in the treaty
with Guatemala, 1901, Art. 1). The provision reads as follows:
Where, on the death of any person holding real property (or
property not personal), within the territories of the one of the
High Contracting Parties, such real property would, by the laws
of the land, pass to a citizen or subject of the other, were he not
disqualified by the laws of the country where such real property is
situated, such citizen . . . shall be allowed a term of three years
in which to sell the same
ing to the authors, succession to land, except by law and in natura, is impaired by the
prl&ement and hampered by exchange restrictions.
On reciprocity, see also Lenhoff, Reciprocity, the Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea,
49 N.W. L. REV. 619 (1954).
Additional recent cases involving state imposed reciprocity, see, In re Schluttig's
Estate, 218 P.2d 819, rev'd 224 P.2d 695 (Cal. 1950); In re Reih's Estate, 227 P.2d (Cal.
1951); In re Meyer's Estate, 238 P.2d 597 (Cal. 1951); In re Peter's Estate, 244 P.2d
88 (1952); In re Caraba's Estate, 250 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1952); In re Krachler's Estate,
263 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1953); In the Matter of the Estate of Leefers, 274 P.2d 239 (Cal.
1954)n re Turner's Estate, 196 Pac. 807 (Cal. 1921), the most-favored-nation clause was
invoked under the treaty with Italy (1871) but no particular treaty was pointed out; the
court relied on Bluthe v. Knikley, 59 Pac. 787 (Cal. 1900) where it was only decided
that a non-discriminatory California statute was not an encroachment on the national
treaty-making power. An explanation may be seen in Succession of Rixner, 48 La. Ann.
552, 19 So. 597, 600 (1896) where the most-favored-nation clause was interpreted simply
as national treatment "to relieve our minds of any complexity in the matter."
241. Potter, Soldiers' Wills, 12 Mon. L. REv. 183 (1949).
242. Text in 47 Am. J. INT'L L. Suppl. 119 (1953).
243. Orr v. Hogson, 4 Wheat. 453 (U.S. 1819); Larkin v. Washington Loan & Trust
Co., 31 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1929) cert. denied, 279 U.S. 867 (1928); Ripley v. Suther-
land, 40 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1930) cert. denied, 282 U.S. 865 (1930).
244. See, UNITED STATES TREATY DEVELOPMENTS.
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It is apparent that this provision applies in situations where (1) intestate
succession involves land in one of the contracting countries, regardless
of the nationality of the deceased who may even be a national of a third
country; (2) such land would fall, according to the controlling law of
the situs, to a treaty alien; and (3) the alien is prevented by the same
law from taking the land. In such a situation, the treaty upholds, in
principle, the discriminatory law of the situs, mitigating it, however,
to the extent that a treaty alien is entitled to take title for a period of
years2"5 during which he has the right to dispose of it (even if he holds
only an estate for years) 246 and to take the proceeds out of the country
safe, in this respect, from local discriminatory treatment.
2 47
Other treaties248 show variations in two points. One variation regards
the application of the rule to both types of succession, testate as well as
245. The period ranges from three to five years; some treaties refer simply to the
local law, others grant a reasonable period. One treaty (with Switzerland) mentions no
period at all.
246. Disqualifying state law is held to be superseded for that period; if the alien
fails to sell, the title will vest in those who would have inherited in absence of a treaty,
Pierson v. Lawler, 100 Neb. 783, 161 N.W. 419 (1917); cf. Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U.S.505 (1894).
247. It is to be observed that at the time when the convention with Great Britain
was concluded only state law in this country contained discriminatory provisions against
aliens, British Parliamentary Papers, Report on the Purchase and Holding of Land by
Aliens, Cm. 1697, (1901) while similar British law was abrogated in 1870, Hanrick v.
Patrick, 119 U.S. 156 (1886).
The great majority of cases interpret the provision to be a reservation in favor of
the lex situs, Doble v. State, 95 Wash. 62, 163 Pac. 37 (1917); State v. O'Connell, 121
Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865 (1922); State v. Toop, 107 Neb. 391, 186 N.W. 371 (1922);
Kennedy's Estate v. Richardson, 41 S. W. 2d 95 (Tex. 1931); Dutton v. Donahue, 44
Wyo. 52, 8 P.2d 90 (1932). In some cases, the opposite result was reached, Die ex
dem. Deckstader v. Roe, 4 Pa. 398, 55 Atl. 341 (1903); Hanafin v. McCarty, 95 NH
36, 57 A2d 148 (1948). In Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1920), the lack of Canada's
notice of adhesion was held decisive. The treaty with Great Britain was invoked under
the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty with Sweden (1910) in Colson v. Carlson,
116 Kan. 593, 227 Pac. 360 (1924), the court holding that the former treaty "virtually
removes the bar of alienage to inheritance of real property, the only qualification being
that the alien heir shall sell the property. .. ."
248. The treaty with Switzerland (1850/5) was involved in Hauenstein v. Lynham,
100 U.S. 483 (1879) (action for proceeds of escheat sale). In Lehman v. State ex rel.
Miller, 45 Ind. App. 330, 88 N.E. 365 (1909), the court upheld the discriminatory
state law on the ground that "by the laws of our state aliens are not permitted to hold
real estate, and, consistent with the last clause of said treaty, have limited time in which
they may transfer the same." In State ex rel. Tanner v. Stacheli, 112 Wash. 344, 192
Pac. 991 994 (1920) the court was "satisfied . . . that (the treaty) does not and was
not intended to modify or avoid any law of the states or of the United States, especially
with reference to real estate."
The treaty with France with its reservation in favor of the local law
in this country (1853, Art. VII) was interpreted in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258
(1889) in the sense that local law was superseded by the treaty and national treatment
granted. A similar attitude prevailed in Bahuaud v. Bize, 105 Fed. 485 (D. Neb. 1901)
finding the local statute against nonresident aliens holding land to be ineffective; similarily,
In re Romari's Estate, 191 Cal. 740, 218 Pac, 421 (1923) the local statute excluding
nonresident aliens from succession unless they claim within five years was held violative
of Art. VII of the French treaty. See note 218 supra.
However, local law prevailed in cases where treaties with German states were in-
volved, e.g., with Bavaria (1845) in Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 69 N.W. 560 (1896);
Bremen (1827) in Schultze v. Schultze, 144 Ill, 290, 33 N.E. 201. (1893); Hanover
(1840) in Ahrens v. Ahrens, 144 Iowa 486, 123 N.W. 164 (1909); Prussia (1828) in
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intestate (".... by the law of the country or by testamentary disposition,
descend or pass . . ." e.g., treaties with Germany, 1923, Art. IV; 1;249
Bolivia, 1858, Art. 12; Brazil, 1828, Art. II; Austria, 1928, Art. IV; El Salvador,
1926, Art. IV; Honduras, 1927, Art. IV; Norway, 1928, Art. IV; Finland,
1934, Art. IV).25o The other variation makes it clear that the recipient
being a treaty alien may or may not be a resident of the country where the
land is situated.
These rules have been followed in treaties entered into after 1945 in
spite of the fact that their importance, at least in regard to this country,
has greatly diminished3 5' Only the language has changed somewhat as
may be shown by the treaty with Uruguay (1949, Art. VII, 2), the
emphasis shifting toward the right to freely dispose of property "with
respect to the acquisition of which through testate or intestate succession
the alienage has prevented them (treaty aliens) from receiving national
treatment" (also Art. IX, 2 of the treaty with Greece, 1951). In the
treaty with Ireland (1951, Art. VII, 1) the phrasing has changed again,
this time to read that ". . . with respect to acquiring all kinds of property
by testate or intestate succession . . . should they (treaty aliens) because
of their alienage be ineligible to continue to own any such property, they
shall be allowed a reasonable period to dispose of it .-. ." (same in treaties
with Colombia, 1951, Art. IX, 3; Israel, 1951, Art. IX, 4; Japan, 1953, Art.
IX, 3; Germany, 1954, Art. IX, 3).
It is natural that treaty law concerning disposition and taking of
personal property2.2 differs considerably from that controlling realty. It
will be observed, first, that treaty law controls only testate succession;
People v. GCerke & Clark, 5 Cal. 381 (1855); Doehrel v. Hillmei, 102 Iowa 169, 71 N.W.
204 (1897); Coos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750, 233 N.W. 13 (1929)- Ripley v. Sutherland,
40 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Saxony (1846) in Ehrlich v. Weber, 114 Tenn. 711,
88 S.W. 188 (1905); Wurtenberg (1844) in Scharpf v. Schmidt, 172 Ill. 255, 50
N.E. 182 (1898); Germany (1871) in Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 111. 40, 33 N.E.
1 49./n re Knutzen's Estate, 161 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1945) the court held that Art.
IV of the treaty with Germany (1923) did not override local Probate Code requiring
reciprocity.
Ehrenweig, Oesterreichische Erben Amerikanischer Verlassenschaften, 73 JuR.
BLAaaER 126 (1951) and Wengler, Erbrecht von Deutschen Staatsangehorigen in den
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, JUR. RUNDscxAu (1951).
250. Art. IV. (2) of the treaty with Finland (1934) as amended in 1952 (TIAS
2861). applies to all kinds of property and both methods of inheritance, allowing "a
reasonable period to dispose" of such property, except in case of ships and shares therein;
here, a limited period may be established by local law.
251. See BoYr, op. cit. supra note 237, at 1005, note 32; FLA. STAT. 4 731.28
(1953).
252. For an exhaustive discussion, Meekinson, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance
of Personal Property, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 313 (1950). Cf. Opton, Recognition of Foreign
leirship and Succession Rights to Personal Property in America, 19 Go. WASH. L. Rav.
156 (1950).
The expired treaty with Brunswick and Luneburg (1954) contained an elaborate
conflict rule providing that citizens may dispose of their personal property "subject to the
laws of the State or country, where the domicile is, or the property is found, either by
testament . . . or in any other manner .... ." (Art 1).
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second, it covers only situations where the deceased was of the same
nationality or residence as the recipient; and lastly, treaty law "does not cover
personalty located in this country and which an American citizen undertakes
to leave" to a treaty alien (e.g., treaty with Germany, 1923, Art. IV, 2, and
treaties modeled after it) 253 However, the recent convention with Germany
(1954, Art. IX, 2) seems to inaugurate a new trend; it grants treaty aliens
national and most-favored-nation treatment "with respect to acquiring ...
personal property . . . ," thus eliminating the stumbling block of the
nationality of the deceased.
In a separate category belong treaties drafted for countries where, at
that time, some traces of the system of Capitulations still lingered on.
There, questions of inheritance to movable property are considered part
of the personal status of the deceased and, consequently, governed by his
national law. According to the treaty with Iraq (1922) national law is
applicable to "successions of movable property" (Art. 4). The same rule
obtains in the agreement with Iran (1928), namely that the personal law
of the deceased will determine "in regard of movable property, the right
of succession by will or ab intestato, distribution and settlement." The
Montreux convention (1937) provided (Art. IX) that "inheritance and
wills shall be governed by the national law of the deceased or of the
testator" (Art. 28 of the Reglement), except where immovable property
is involved.
A peculiar conflict rule has survived in the treaty with Switzerland
(1850/5) where, in addition to a conflict rule concerning judicial jurisdiction
over succession, Article VI contains the rule that such controversies "shall
be decided according to the laws . . . of the country in which the property
is situated," i.e., are governed by the substantive law of the situs of the
estate involved. In a recent case, however, this provision was interpreted
to allow renvoi, that is, to refer to the conflict law of the situs. 25 . 2A5
Finally, it is to be noted that consular conventions 250 usually confer
upon consular officers, among other privileges, the right to "take charge
of the property left by the decedent, for the preservation and protection
of the same." However, in most instances, they may act in this capacity
of provisional curators only "so far as the laws of the country permit"
(e.g., Spain, 1902, Art. 27, 2; Liberia, 1938, Art. VIII, 2; Philippincs, 1947,
253. Clark v. AlIen, 331 U.S. 503 (19471; ci. Vogel v. New York Life Ins. Co., 55
l".2d 205 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied 287 U.S. 604 (1932).
254. See note 81 supra.
255. Note Agreement relating to the resolution of conflicting claims to German
enemy assets (Brussels, 1947, 2 US' 731) especially Part. 2, Art. 7-10, dealing with
decedents' estates.
256. Coudert, Right of Consular Officers to Letters of Administration under Treaties
with Foreign Nations, 13 COL. L. REv. 181 (1913); Puente, Consular Protection of
Estates of Deceased Nationals, 23 ILL. L. Rxv. 635 (1929).
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Art. IX, 2) a complete reservation in favor of local law. 257 The right to
claim administration of the estate is, in most treaties, also conditioned
upon the law of the situs and, in addition, the appointment left within
the discretion of the court (" . . . in the discretion of the court competent
to take cognizance of the case, provided the laws of the place where the
estate is administered permit such action by the consular officer and
appointment by the court," Art. 13, 3 of the convention with Cuba,
1926) .2 5 The same principle is followed 259 in treaties with Germany, 1923,
Art. 24, 2; Austria, 1928, Art. 19, 2; El Salvador, 1926, Art. 22, 2; Finland,
1934, Art. 26; Honduras, 1927, Art. 22; Hungary, 1925, Art. 20; Mexico,
1942, Art. VIII, 2; Norway, 1928, Art. 23, 2; Philippines, 1947, Art. IX,
Sweden, 1910, Art. 14, 2; Thailand, 1937, Art. 15, 2, etc.
26
A new trend is noticeable in the recent convention with Costa Rica
(1948, TIAS 2045). According to Article IX (2) (d) consular officers are
put, in regard to their right to claim administration of estates of their
nationals, in the same position as persons they represent under the
convention, i.e., non-resident nationals not legally represented in the receiving
country and holding or claiming a legal or equitable interest in the estate
(Art. IX, 2, a). As a consequence, consular officers arc granted the right
to "apply for and receive a grant to the same extent as the person he
represents would have had." Compared with the standard treaty law,
it is to be observed that courts retain no discretion in appointing consular
officers as administrators wherever persons they represent under the
authority of the convention could claim such administration according to
local law. The previous general reservation in favor of local law appears
to have been changed: while under previous treaties consular officers could
be excluded by anyone entitled to such administration according to local
257. Note Art. IX of the treaty with Argentina (1853) granting consular officers
the right "to intervene in the possession, administration and judicial liquidation of
estates of the deceased, conformably with the laws of the country . . ." analyzed in
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912). Cf. San Martin, La Regulacion Convencional
de las Relaciones Consulares, Acuerdos Suscriptos por la Republica Argentina, 3-4
REvISTA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y CIENCAS DIPLOMATICAS, 327 (1953).
258. See 54 STAT. 758 (1940), 22 U.S. §§ 1175 - 1177 (1952); on acceptance
of administration, 32 STAT. 546 (1902), 22 U.S.C. H 1178, 1179 and 22 CODE FED.
REcs. § 120.28 (Supp. 1953).
259. The problem was discussed in relation to the treaty with Germany (1923) in
In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 252 (Surr. Ct. 1929); Schneider
v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 16 A.2d 861 (1940); Wyers v. Arnold, 347 Mo. 413, 147
S.W.2d 644 (1941); Seaboard Fruit Co. v. Topkin, 130 N.J. Eq. 46, 20 A.2d 709
(Ch. 1941). The corresponding provision of the now denounced treaty with Poland
(1934) was litigated, eg., In re Swistak's Estate, 129 N.J. Eq. 138, 18 A.2d 561
(Prerog. Ct. 1941); State ex rel. Ripa v. Lake Superior Court, 43 N.E. 2d 871 (Ind.
1942); In re Skewy's Estate, 181 Misc. 479, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 942 (Surr. Ct. 1944); Lacho-
witz v. Lachowitz, 30 A.2d 793 (Md. 1943); In re Zalewski, 292 N.Y. 332, 55 N.E. 184
(1944); Petition of Mazurowski, 116 N.E. 2d 854 (1953).
260. Here, the provision is carefully drafted to read "provided the regulations of his
own Government permit such appointment and provided such appointment is not in
conflict with local laws and the tribunal having jurisdiction has no special reasons for
appointing someone else."
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law, they now rank equally with persons they represent under the con-
ventiona
11
This advantage is available, of course, to all countries enjoying in this
respect, the most-favored-nation treatment (e.g., France, 1853, Art. 12;
Spain, 1902, Art. 28; Greece, 1902, Art. 11).2126
XVI
GENERAL PROBLEMS
Characterization.-The question as to what law shall determine the
meaning of words used in treaties is generally answered by pointing out
that treaties express the consent of the contracting countries which consent,
by necessity, includes treaty semantics as well. A method to secure
uniformity in fact is, of course, to agree upon definitions, a practice
largely followed in treaties. There are, however, meth6ds where the
assumption of the inherent uniformity of treaty semantics is abandoned.
One method, frequently used, expressly abandons the dogmatic uniformity
by saying that "any term . . . shall have . . . the meaning which it has
under the laws of that Contracting State," i.e., of the country applying the
treaty provision involved (e.g., convention on double taxation with France,
1946, Art. 2, 2, TIAS 1982). The other method introduces an express
conflict rule pointing out the contact to be followed and, through it, the
law to be used in characterizing the particular treaty term.
Domicile. Treaty law in regard to the characterization of domicile is
to be found mainly in conventions on double taxation.' '  Though the
underlying problem of jurisdiction to tax is, for obvious reasons, omitted
from the present discussion, still it is interesting to look into the characteriza-
tion, within this area, of sonic of the fundamental notions used in
conflict law.
261. The consular convention with Great Britain (1949, 81st Cong. Zd Sess., Exec.
A) contained in Art. 18 elaborate provisions concerning administration of estates by
consular officers. However, this article having been questioned, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations brought this "informally to the attention of the department of
State" (82d Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. 8); subsequently, a new convention was submitted
(82d Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. 0) without Art. 18, which convention was ratified (TIAS
2494). Consular administration is now permitted (Art. 27) only if it involves no "con-
flict with the law of the territory" and such activity is "in accordance with international
law or practice . . . recognized in that territory or are acts to which no objection is taken
by the receiving state."
The convention with Ireland (1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. P) was adopted
with a supplementary protocol added (1952) deleting Art. 18 and qualifying the most-
favored-nation clause contained in Art. 5 (3) as not to apply to "functions and activities
of consular officers in relation to administration of estates." (Art. 2 of the Protocol;
Cf. 98 Cong. Rec., 7222).
262. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 20 (1931); Rocca v. 'Thompson, 223 U.S. 317
L 1912). Cf. Hamilton v. Erie Ry., 219 N.Y. 343, 114 N.E. 300; and Evans v. Cano de
astillo, 247 S.W.2d 947 (Ark. 1952].
263. XVENCLER, BEITRAGE ZUM JROBLEM DER INTERNATIONALEN DOPPELESTEUE-
RUNC, me BECRIFFSaILDUNG ]AI INTERNATIONALI:N STEHERRECHT (1935).
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It appears that three different rules of characterization of domicile
are adopted. One applies the lex loci and characterizes domicile according
to the law of the place of the alleged domicile".2" This doctrine is followed
in the convention with Great Britain (1945, 60 STAT. 1391). There it is
formulated to read that "the question whether a decedent was domiciled
in any part of the territories of the . . . Parties . - . shall be determined
in accordance with the law in force in that territory" (Art. III, 2; also
Greece, 1950, Art. IV, 1, TIAS 2091, and Australia, 1953, Art. 1I, 3, TIAS
2879). The other rule, namely that domicile shall be characterized according
to the lex fori (in the sense of the officiating administrative agency) is
followed, for example, in the convention with Canada (1950, 2 UST 2247);
there, the provision reads that "domicile shall be determined in accordance
with the laws of the contracting state imposing the tax on the basis of
domicile" (same, Switzerland, 1951, Art. II, 3, TIAS 2533). In an amend-
ment to the convention with France (1946) the same doctrine prevailed
(1947, TIAS 1983) over the original convention adhering to the lege loci
characterization. Moreover, there is a third rule as adopted in the Agree-
ment relating to the solution of conflicting claims to German enemy assets
(Brussels, 1947, 2 UST 742). The agreement (Art. VII, D) characterizes
domicile according to the lex rei sitae by providing that the domicile of
the deceased "shall be determined according to the law of the Party
within whose jurisdiction the property is located."
Immovables.-It is a well established principle that the characterization
of immovable property follows the law of the situs. This rule is adopted,
for example, in the convention with France (1939, Art. III, 2, a, TIAS
1982) providing that "the question whether any other property or right
in property constitutes real property shall be determined ill accordance with
the law of the place where the land involved is located"2 15 (same, Norway,
1949, Art. II, 1, a, 2 UST 2354). However, there is a group of treaties
adhering to the opposite doctrine of characterization according to the
law of the forum, e.g., the convention with Canada (1949, Art. II, 3, 59
STAT. 915); there the rule reads that "The question whether rights relating
to or secured by real property are to be considered as real property . . .
shall be determined in accordance with the laws of the contracting State
imposing tax" (same, Greece, Art. III, 3, TIAS 2901).111
264. But see Joseph, Domicile and Residence of Individuals for American Tax Pur-
poses, 29 TAxEs 916, 921 (1951).
265. There is an important discrepancy between the English and the French text
of the convention in the portion concerning the situs of interests in real property; "...
les droits imobiliers (seront reput6s situ6s) sur le territoire on se trouvent les immeubles
auxquelles ils s'appliquent" is omitted in the English text which omission is continued
in the portion given in the text concluding with "... ou le bien sur lequel porte le droit
envisag6."
266. In Laird v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 931 (1953) the court quoted the con-
trolling treaty provision, yet decided the issue after checking all three competing laws,
i.e., the law of Canada, of Wisconsin and of the United States, following fortunately the
same doctrine.
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Force majeure.-Factors beyond control are characterized, according
to various conventions concerning parcel post, in accord with the lex loci
damni. A typical provision is contained in the Universal Postal Convention
(Buenos Aires, 1939, 54 Stat. 2049) to the effect that force majeure is
to be determined "in accordance with the internal legislation (of the
country) in the service of which the loss or damage occurs." The same rule
appears in other conventions, e.g., with Switzerland (1932, 47 STAT. 1997),
force majeure to be defined "by the legal decisions or rulings in force in
the country in whose territory the case has arisen" (Art. 15, 2).
Dol.-A rule how to characterize 'dol' (dolus, i.e., bad intent) is
contained in the Warsaw convention (1929). According to Article 25, a
carrier is denied the right to invoke provisions of the convention limiting
his liability where "the damage is caused by his 'dol' or by such default
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the
case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to 'dol.' It is apparent
that the convention has adopted the civil law notion of 'dol' and added,
for common law countries, an auxiliary rule of characterization instructing
the courts to substitute, in case the notion of 'dol' is not a part of the
lex fori, its own notion considered, according to the lex fori, "equivalent
to dol."
It is to be pointed out that the convention, at least as in force in
this country,267 has not eliminated the notion of 'dol' and substituted that
of wilful misconduct. The only authentic text of the convention, the
French, contains as the basic criterion for liability the notion of 'do]'
which term was, after an apparently unsuccessful attempt to find a
more satisfactory English terms,208 translated as wilful misconduct. There-
fore, the notion of 'dol' remains the controlling standard, to be characterized
in countries where 'dol' is not a current legal notion, in accord with the
notion which is, according to the lex fori, the nearest equivalent to 'dol.'
From this it appears erroneous to assume that wilful misconduct has to
replace 'dol,' especially since 'dol' is based primarily upon intent and
does not include, in principle, elements which, according to civil law,
would fall under the opposite category of 'culpa,' whether 'culpa lata' (gross
negligence) or 'culpa levis' (ordinary negligence).269
Renvoi.-The only treaty provision on renvoi is contained in the
R~glement (Art. 31) annexed to the now expired Montreux convention
267. In Great Britain the English translation of the convention is enacted as statute;
consequently, the notion of 'do]' is eliminated and replaced with 'wilful misconduct', a
notion developed there in railway cases, SHAwCRoss & BEAUMONT, AIR Lw 362
(2d. ed. 1951). Cf. Horabin v. B.O.A.C., 119521 2 All. E. R. 1016.
268. Goedhus, op. cit. 272.
269. The inclusion of 'culpa lata' into 'dol' according to the adage 'culpa lata dolo
equiparatur' is questionable even for French law, MAZEAUD, TRAxmT THEO QUE ET
PnA'rrIu DE A RrspoNslfnLImT CIVILE . ..406 (1947); even so, the notion of 'dol'
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(1937). There, renvoi is rejected in situations where the reference to the
law applicable is made by means of the contact of nationality; such
reference "shall be understood to mean the municipal law of the country
in question to the exclusion of the provisions of private international
law" (Art. 31).
as used in the convention does not necessarily follow the meaning it has in French
law, cf. LAwsoN, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 36 (1950).
Cases in this country indicate a tendency toward restrictive interpretation of wilful
misconduct, eg., Ullen v. Am. Airlines, 1948 U.S. Av. Rep. 161, a'd, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 195J. U.S. Av. Rep. 296,
rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951) cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951);
Coepp v. Am. Overseas Airlines, 1951 U.S. Av. Rep. 527 1952 U.S. & Can., Av. Rep.
486; Frornan v. Am. Airways, 1953 U.S. & Can. Av. Rep 1.
For a recent French case, see Hennesy v. Companie Air France, Ct. of Appeal, Paris
(1954) 49 AM, 1. INT. L. 95 (1955).
See DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw 197 (1954).
